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Penalizing Punitive Damages:
Why the Supreme Court Needs a
Lesson in Law and Economics
Steve P. Calandrillo*
Abstract
The recent landmark Supreme Court decision addressing punitive dam-
ages in the infamous Exxon Valdez oil spill case has brought the issue of puni-
tive awards back into the legal limelight. Modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence, most notably BMW of North America, Inc., State Farm, Philip
Morris, and now Exxon Shipping Co. in 2008, has concluded that such judg-
ments are justified to punish morally reprehensible behavior and to send a
message to evildoers. The Court, however, has increasingly emphasized that
the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause presumptively limits punitive
awards, drawing an arbitrary line in the sand of no more than ten times actual
damages.
This Article critically examines modern punitive damages jurisprudence
using a law and economics lens. From that standpoint, there is no justifiable
basis for tort law's requirement of morally reprehensible or intentional con-
duct before punitive damages may be awarded. Indeed, punitives should be
imposed-must for deterrence purposes-even in the absence of egregious be-
havior, when a defendant has escaped liability previously, either intentionally
or serendipitously. In this manner, the punitive award makes up for the occa-
sions in which the defendant avoided liability and failed to compensate victims
for harm caused. On the other hand, sound economic analysis dictates that
imposing enormous punitive damages simply because a tortfeasor's behavior
was morally offensive can inadvertently lead to overdeterrence, price inflation
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beyond optimum, quantity of goods purchased below optimum, and a signifi-
cant reduction in overall social welfare. In sum, the Supreme Court must
drastically revise its approach to punitive damages jurisprudence: such awards
should not be arbitrarily based on a gut reaction to how reprehensibly we feel
a defendant acted. Rather, punitive damages should be granted only where
tortfeasors have the potential to escape liability for their actions, and they
should be awarded in that case even if the defendant in no way meets the
modern requirement of egregious behavior. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
arbitrary due process litmus test of ten times compensatory damages as a ceil-
ing on punitive damages makes zero sense from an economic analysis point of
view, and needs to be summarily abolished.
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Introduction
Throughout history, punitive damages have served to punish indi-
viduals who engage in morally egregious and reckless behavior. The
ancient Code of Hammurabi as well as the powerful Roman Empire
viewed punitive damages as a means to express society's disapproval
of certain actions by punishing the defendant well above and beyond a
victim's need for compensation.1 Sadly, our current U.S. Supreme
Court sees the issue only slightly differently, holding that punitive
damages awards should justly send a message to reckless defendants
based largely or solely on the moral reprehensibility of their
behavior.2
1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1-5 (5th ed. 2005). Schlueter provides a
detailed summary of the history of punitive damages from their roots in ancient law to the transi-
tion into modem U.S. jurisprudence.
2 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) ("'[T]he
most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."' (alteration in original) (quoting BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996))). The view that punitive damages should be used to send
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In its defense, the Supreme Court has been concerned about
preventing juries from handing down punitive damages awards that
are entirely arbitrary.3 Unfortunately, the manner in which the Court
has gone about curing this problem has been completely arbitrary in
its own right. In the early 1990s, the Court required that a jury be
given instructions that provide "reasonable constraints" on its discre-
tion to provide punitive damages.4 Two years later, in TXO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,5 a divided Court found that
punitive damages awards could not be "grossly excessive," whatever
that phrase might be interpreted to mean.6 Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg7 followed, in which the Court found that judicial review of pu-
nitive damages awards was necessary because such oversight provided
a check on punitive damage awards that may be the result of bias or
prejudice toward the defendant.8 Shifting its analysis to one predi-
cated on the notion that punitive damages are quasi-criminal, the
Court held in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.9
that courts of appeals must review punitive awards under a de novo
standard.10 The Court justified this opinion by invoking the old adage
that punishment must be proportional to the offense, while explicitly
referencing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines
and cruel and unusual punishment.11
Unfortunately, the Court's solution in each case failed to solve
the ultimate problem: jury awards that aim to put a price tag on the
defendant's level of moral reprehensibility are inherently arbitrary.
a message to particularly offensive defendants can trace its origins to the century-old case of
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893), where the Court
described such an award as a "way of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others,"
id. at 107.
3 See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2627 ("[A] penalty should be reasonably predict-
able in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes's 'bad man' can look ahead with some ability to
know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another." (citing Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897))).
4 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991).
5 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
6 Id. at 458.
7 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
8 Id. at 432 (holding that the absence of judicial review violated due process).
9 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
10 Id. at 443.
11 See id. at 432-34; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.24 (1996) ("The
principle that the punishment should fit the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common-law jurisprudence." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). But cf. Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 274-76 (1989) (rejecting a
challenge to punitive damages based on the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause).
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Under modern traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence, there is sim-
ply no way to consistently or fairly put a dollar value on society's dis-
approval of certain "reprehensible" behaviors. Justice Scalia,
criticizing the majority opinion in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,12 which presumptively limited punitive damages to no more
than ten times actual harm,13 stated that "[t]he Court has constructed
a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that does not inform
state legislatures and lower courts-that does nothing at all except
confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc
determination that this particular award of punitive damages was not
'fair.' "14
Moreover, current jurisprudence, which examines a defendant's
financial condition before assessing punitive damages, 15 results in dis-
parate and unequal treatment because the damages award is not
based on an individual's actual conduct, but instead on an individual's
position. 16 Justice O'Connor in her TXO dissent specifically ex-
pressed this fear, explaining that "[c]ourts long have recognized that
jurors may view large corporations with great disfavor.' 1 7 Unfortu-
nately, this concern has more than materialized in recent Supreme
Court decisions.18
12 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
13 See id. at 581-82. Though the Court maintained it was not establishing "a simple math-
ematical formula," id. at 582, this seems to be a rule honored in the breach. For research sug-
gesting that lower courts do tend to use a simple mathematical formula, see generally Lauren R.
Goldman & Nickolai G. Levin, State Farm at Three: Lower Courts' Application of the Ratio
Guidepost, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 509 (2006).
14 BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15 See, e.g., Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989) ("The defendant's
financial position is ... a consideration essential to a post-judgment critique of a punitive dam-
ages award.").
16 Perhaps analogously, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., famously longed for the day when
persons would "be judged [not] by the color of their skin but by the content of their character."
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 28, 1963), in 114 CONG. Rac. 9163, 9165 (1968). Of course, there is a difference between
racial discrimination against individuals and financial discrimination against wealthy corpora-
tions, but the same basic principle that actors should be judged on their actions (rather than who
they are) applies.
17 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 490 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
18 Cf Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991) (noting that while the
factfinder can properly consider the financial position of the defendant, that should not mean
that plaintiffs should "enjoy a windfall [simply] because they have the good fortune to have a
defendant with a deep pocket"). Of course, juries do not always consider a defendant's financial
position when determining punitive damages. Compare id. at 6 (noting that the jury did not hear
evidence on Pacific Mutual's wealth), with Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614
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Against this backdrop, the oft-criticized law and economics
movement provides a principled, workable solution by viewing puni-
tive damages as a means of creating socially optimal deterrence and
levels of care, rather than as a tool for imposing punishment for mor-
ally reprehensible actions.19 The ultimate goal of modern tort law ju-
risprudence should be to make injurers internalize the full costs of all
of their actions so that they will take the proper level of care-not too
much, not too little, but just right.20 Jurors would have no reason to
take into account a defendant's wealth, but would instead be asked to
focus on what amount of money would incentivize the defendant, or
other similarly situated parties, to act in a socially optimal manner in
the future. 21 Such an analysis would avoid arbitrary determinations of
how offensive the particular defendant's behavior was, and instead
would focus on whether she had a chance of escaping liability that
justified the award of punitive damages. 22 Indeed, punitive damages
should be imposed (nay, must for deterrence purposes) even in the
absence of egregious behavior when a defendant has escaped liability
previously, either intentionally or serendipitously. Conversely, sound
economic analysis dictates that imposing punitive damages simply be-
cause a tortfeasor's behavior was morally offensive can inadvertently
lead to overdeterrence, price increases beyond optimum, quantity of
(2008) (noting that the jury was instructed to consider Exxon's wealth during their
deliberations).
19 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873-76 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages should be utilized to serve
the goal of deterrence rather than that of punishment per se). Polinsky and Shavell note that
Jeremy Bentham was perhaps the first to observe that sanctions must be increased in order to
achieve optimal deterrence if defendants can potentially escape liability. See id. at 876 n.12;
JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 402
(John Bowring ed., 1962) ("[Als there are always some chances of escape, it is necessary to
increase the value of the punishment, to counterbalance these changes of impunity."). Other
notable economic scholars who have addressed punitive damages include Robert D. Cooter,
Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989), and
Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale,
40 ALA. L. REV. 741 (1989).
20 See generally Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 873, 878-900 (discussing optimal
damages for deterrence purposes when the defendant is found liable with certainty or can some-
times escape liability, and the relationship between punitive damages and the basic economic
theory of deterrence).
21 See id. at 910-14.
22 Legendary Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner was one of the first to reference the
factor of escaping liability as a justification for the imposition of punitive damages. See RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77-78 (1972); see also Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fair-
ness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1982).
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goods purchased far below optimum, and a significant reduction in
overall social welfare.
L Traditional Punitive Damages Law
The concept of punitive damages has ancient origins. The follow-
ing discussion traces the evolution of such damages from antiquity,
through English common law, and into American jurisprudence, in-
cluding the complex and (at times) contradictory legal rubric fash-
ioned by the modern U.S. Supreme Court for determining the
constitutional limitations on punitive damages.
A. Historical Origins
Punitive damages can trace their historical origins as far back as
Hammurabi's Code in 2000 B.C.23 As their name suggests, they have
been used to punish wrongdoers for the reprehensibility of their con-
duct. Under ancient Roman law, punitive damages were imposed
where "the essence of the delict [offense] was not loss but insult, and
therefore the money payment must usually have represented not com-
pensation in the ordinary sense, but rather solace for injured feelings
or affronted dignity. [Hence, t]he action had ... the ... characteristics
of a penal action .... ",24 Punitive damages were an attempt to express
society's distaste for an offense rather than actually to compensate
victims.
The modern concept of punitive damages first arose in England
in the case of Wilkes v. Wood.25 In 1762, John Wilkes published a
pamphlet that was allegedly libelous against the king.26 In response,
Wilkes's house was searched and his property seized by, among
others, Wood.27 The Court of Common Pleas granted Wilkes's re-
quest for punitive damages in his case against the king's agent because
compensatory damages were deemed too small to deter the wrong-
doer from causing such harm again.28 English courts have since also
utilized punitive damages to compensate for nonpecuniary losses such
as harm to one's image.29
23 SCHLUETER, supra note 1, at 2.
24 BARRY NICHOLAs, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 217 (1975).
25 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
26 Id. at 493-94.
27 Id. at 489-91.
28 Id. at 498-99.
29 See Benson v. Frederick, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B.) (upholding a damages award
that was greater than the physical harm because the injury was unreasonable and the victim "was
scandalized and disgraced").
[Vol. 78:774
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In the United States, there was some confusion over the purpose
of punitive damages when they were initially introduced into our legal
system. 30 At times they were used as extracompensatory damages to
account for the trial fees incurred by successful litigants, 31 whereas at
other times they focused on the more traditional goals of punishment
and deterrence.32 Over a century ago, in Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Railway v. Prentice,33 the Supreme Court described punitive
damages as "being awarded, not by way of compensation to the suf-
ferer, but by way of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to
others. ' 34 More recently, the Court restated this view, explaining that
punitive damages "are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are
private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and
deter its future occurrence. 35
B. Modern Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The following discussion examines seven seminal cases in which
the Court undertook to clarify the relationship between punitive dam-
ages and the constitutional rights of defendants. Unfortunately, the
resulting body of law is complex, confusing, and preoccupied with
seemingly arbitrary constitutional limitations; lacks a coherent and
consistent regime for determining punitives; and, most disturbingly,
fails to serve the essential functions of punitive damages: punishment,
deterrence, and supplemental compensation.
1. Haslip: Seven Factors to Guide the Jury
Modern Supreme Court rulings on punitive damages have largely
focused on the issue through the lens of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, asking whether the sanction is so "arbitrary"
30 SCHLUETER, supra note 1, at 15-16.
31 See, e.g., Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957, 958 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 1681)
(holding that a jury could include extra costs, such as trial fees, in a punitive damages award even
though they were not allowed in the compensatory damages award).
32 See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) ("[A] jury may inflict
what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the
enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.").
33 Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
34 Id. at 107.
35 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). In Gertz, Justice Powell refused
to allow punitive damages in a libel case where "liability [was] not based on a showing of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 349. Justice Powell essentially reasoned
that punitive damages could not be assessed under the negligence standard at play in the case
because no punishment beyond payment of compensatory damages was necessary. See id. at
350.
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or "grossly excessive" as to deprive the defendant of its constitutional
right to due process under the law. 36 In 1991, the Court decided Pa-
cific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,37 a case involving an insur-
ance agent's fraudulent failure to renew his client's health insurance
policy.38 The jury returned a general verdict of $1,040,000, 3 9 of which
at least $840,000 was classified as punitive damages.n° The Court fo-
cused its analysis on whether the jury's discretion in determining the
award was subject to "reasonable constraints" so as not to be entirely
arbitrary.41 Citing the Alabama Supreme Court's review with ap-
proval, Justice Blackmun reiterated seven factors that a court should
employ to evaluate its punitive damages award.42 A court is to
consider:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from
the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred;
(b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's con-
duct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's aware-
ness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of
similar past conduct;
(c) the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful con-
duct and the desirability of removing that profit and of hav-
ing the defendant also sustain a loss;
(d) the "financial position" of the defendant;
(e) all the costs of litigation;
(f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant
for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and
(g) the existence of other civil awards against the defen-
dant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in
mitigation.43
The Court determined that the objective criteria used by the
lower courts to evaluate the propriety of the jury's award (including
36 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Only when a [puni-
tive] award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these [state] interests
does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456 (1993))).
37 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
38 Id. at 4-6.
39 Id. at 6-7.
40 Id. at 7 n.2.
41 Id. at 20 ("As long as the [jury's] discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints,
due process is satisfied.").
42 Id. at 21-22.
43 Id.
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defendant's degree of reprehensibility) satisfied due process concerns
and therefore upheld the punitive damages award.a"
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but expressed his belief
that the Constitution itself placed no explicit constraints on punitive
damages awards. 45 He defended this position by noting that punitive
damages were "undoubtedly an established part of the American
common law of torts" when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed.46
No special procedures were thought necessary at the time of the pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment, so the Court should not impose
its own version of "reasonable constraints" on the jury's discretion to
award punitive damages.47
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor eloquently described
the key element-arbitrariness-that has ultimately led to such incon-
sistent and confused Supreme Court rulings on the subject. 48 Justice
O'Connor believed that the Court needed to impose stronger con-
straints on a jury's discretion to avoid such unpredictable punitive
damages awards.49 While she did not question the legitimacy of puni-
tive damages in general, the Justice stated boldly, "I see a strong need
to provide juries with standards to constrain their discretion so that
they may exercise their power wisely, not capriciously or maliciously.
The Constitution requires as much. ' 50 She added that "[v]ague refer-
ences to 'the character and the degree of the wrong' and the 'necessity
of preventing similar wrong' do not assist a jury in making a reasoned
decision; they are too amorphous. '51 Justice O'Connor's solution was
to require that states adopt precise methods to constrain juries in their
imposition of punitive damages and to fix the amounts awarded.52 She
did not offer a specific method, but believed that states should be al-
lowed to experiment with and define their own methods.53
44 Id. at 23-24.
45 Id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
46 Id. at 26.
47 Id. at 26-28.
48 Id. at 63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 42-43.
50 Id. at 43.
51 Id. at 48.
52 Id. at 63.
53 Id. at 63-64. Justice O'Connor has long been known as an ardent supporter of entrust-
ing controversial topics to the "laboratory of the States." Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For example, though joining the majority in
upholding New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997),
she nevertheless stated her belief that other states could legalize and regulate the practice if they
so chose, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 & n.t (1997) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring), opening the door to Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. On this latter topic, see generally
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Justice O'Connor's dissent highlighted a crucial flaw in the Su-
preme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence: namely, how can pu-
nitive damages awards avoid being arbitrary when they are based on
inherently subjective factors like the defendant's degree of reprehen-
sibility? Up to this point in our judicial history, the Court was unsuc-
cessfully employing a procedural due process rationale to address this
core question. In the following case, the Court turned to a different
set of constitutional principles for its analysis.
2. TXO: Punitive Damages Must Not Be "Grossly Excessive"
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 54 a splin-
tered Supreme Court attempted to further constrain punitive damages
awards, invoking constitutional substantive due process protections in
addition to purely procedural ones.5 5 In explaining this doctrinal shift,
Justice Stevens opined that "the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment imposes substantive limits 'beyond which penal-
ties may not go' -;56 therefore, under this TXO test, such awards may
not be "grossly excessive. '57 Despite this alleged concern, the plural-
ity ultimately upheld a punitive damages award in TXO that was 526
times greater than the compensatory damages in the case because the
defendant's actions could have led to substantial loss for the plaintiffs
and because its behavior was "part of a larger pattern of fraud, trick-
ery and deceit. '58
Perhaps cognizant of Justice O'Connor's fears in Haslip, Justice
Kennedy stated in his TXO concurrence that the Court's review of
Steve P. Calandrillo, Corralling Kevorkian: Regulating Physician-Assisted Suicide in America, 7
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 41 (1999).
54 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). The case concerned a
dispute over title related to a joint venture in an oil and gas development project. Id. at 447.
The jury awarded the lessor of the property $19,000 in compensatory damages and an astounding
$10 million in punitive damages. Id. at 451. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
affirmed the award, id. at 452-53, and the U.S. Supreme Court found that the punitive judgment
in the case was not so "grossly excessive" as to violate substantive due process protections, id. at
462.
55 Id. at 453-54, 458. For a further general discussion of the Court's substantive due pro-
cess approach to punitive damages, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment,
56 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1055-57 (2004).
56 TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 453-54 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207
U.S. 73, 78 (1907)).
57 Id. at 454 (citation omitted).
58 Id. at 453, 462. One year after the TXO case, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S.
415 (1994), the Court added to the protections afforded defendants, holding that judicial review
of punitive damages awards was necessary because such oversight provided a check on awards
that were the result of bias or prejudice toward the defendant, id. at 432.
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punitive damages should focus not on some abstract concept like
whether an award is "grossly excessive," but rather should focus on
the jury's actual reasons for its award.59 The due process protection is
not based on a specific dollar amount or ratio but rather avoidance of
"arbitrary or irrational deprivations of property. "60 Justice Kennedy
pointed out that the jury could rationally have made its award based
on evidence of the defendant's "deliberate, wrongful conduct" to
meet "the [state's] goals of punishment and deterrence." 61
3. BMW: Three Guideposts
The next significant opportunity for the Court to refine limits on
punitive damages came in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,62 a
seminal case in which an Alabama jury initially awarded $4000 in
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages to the de-
frauded owner of a BMW vehicle. 63 The case was based on BMW's
practice of repainting slightly damaged cars and selling them as new
without disclosing the damage to buyers. 64 Deciding it was finally
time to set out a clear standard for reviewing punitive damages
awards, the BMW Court famously laid out "[t]hree guideposts" for
analysis:
(1) "the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct";
(2) the disparity between the harm or potential harm suf-
fered by plaintiff and the punitive damages award (i.e., the
"ratio" analysis); and
(3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases.
65
The first factor explicitly requires a court to examine "the degree
of reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct," stating it was "[p]erhaps
the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive dam-
59 TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
60 Id. at 467.
61 Id. at 469. In another concurrence, Justice Scalia reiterated his position that the Consti-
tution requires only reasonable procedural protections and places no "reasonableness" limita-
tion on the amount of punitive damages. Id. at 471 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
62 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
63 Id. at 564-65. The $4 million punitive judgment was later reduced by the Alabama
Supreme Court to $2 million, but even that reduction still faced constitutional challenge before
the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 567.
64 See id. at 562-64.
65 See id. at 574-85.
2010]
The George Washington Law Review
ages award. ' 66 The Court justified its emphasis on this prong by ex-
plaining simply that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than
others" and thus may support a larger award. 67 In its review of the
specific facts of the BMW case, the Court examined whether the harm
was "purely economic" and whether the defendant's actions demon-
strated a "reckless disregard for the health and safety of others. '68
Further, it added that the degree-of-reprehensibility guidepost may
also allow for more severe penalties based on a repeated pattern of
bad conduct. 69
The second BMW factor dictated that punitive "damages must
bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages. '70 Justice
Stevens explained this comparative-ratio analysis, pointing out that
the Haslip Court had found a relationship of 4:1 to be close to the
constitutional limit,71 and that the Court in TXO "suggested that the
relevant ratio was not more than 10 to 1."172 The BMW Court rejected
the adoption of an absolute mathematical ratio, however, again focus-
ing the inquiry on whether an award was reasonable. 73 Depending on
the other BMW factors, a low compensatory damages award may sup-
port a higher ratio if "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only
a small amount of economic damages. ' '74
The third BMW guidepost required a reviewing court to compare
the punitive damages award with the relevant civil or criminal penal-
ties for comparable misconduct. 75 The goal of this final factor was to
use what the legislature had already determined to be a fair punish-
ment in assessing society's distaste for certain conduct.76 Because the
Court believed it was possible that a lesser penalty could have had a
similar deterrent effect (a questionable proposition, in this author's
opinion77), the large punitive award in BMW was held to be unjusti-
fied and unconstitutional. 78
66 Id. at 575.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 576.
69 Id. at 577.
70 Id. at 580 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Id. at 581 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991)).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 582-83.
74 Id. at 582.
75 Id. at 583.
76 See id.
77 See infra Part III.
78 BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 584.
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4. Cooper v. Leatherman: Searching Scrutiny of Punitive Awards
In 2001, the Supreme Court added teeth to the BMW standard in
the case of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.79
The litigation concerned a dispute between rival tool manufacturers, 80
but the relevant legal issue was whether the Ninth Circuit erred by
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the district
court's consideration of the punitive damages award.81 The Supreme
Court held that searching scrutiny must be given to any such punitive
verdicts, stating "that courts of appeals should apply a de novo stan-
dard ... when passing on district courts' determinations of the consti-
tutionality of punitive damage awards. '82 A less demanding abuse-of-
discretion standard of review does not pass constitutional muster.
5. State Farm: Defendant's Reprehensibility Is Key; Presumptive
Single-Digit Ratio
Not long after Cooper, the Supreme Court once again took up
the issue of punitive damages in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Campbell,8 3 hoping to clarify the relative importance of the
BMW guideposts. The Campbells had sued State Farm for bad faith,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of an
insurance dispute. 84 Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, and in the com-
pensatory and punitive damages phase of the trial, they successfully
introduced evidence that pertained to State Farm's business practices
in numerous states but which bore no relation to the type of claims
underlying the Campbells' complaint.85 A Utah jury considering this
information returned a $2.6 million compensatory damages judgment
topped off by an astounding $145 million in punitives.86 Not surpris-
ingly, State Farm countered with a substantive due process objection,
but the Utah Supreme Court stood firm, holding that the punitive
79 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
80 Id. at 427-28.
81 Id. at 426. After finding Cooper Industries guilty of unfair competition, a federal jury
awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $50,000 and an additional $4.5 million in puni-
tive damages. Id. The district court determined that the punitive damages award did not violate
the Constitution, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed while applying a relatively lenient abuse-of-
discretion standard to the district court's determination. Id.
82 Id. at 436.
83 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
84 Id. at 413-14.
85 Id. at 414-15.
86 Id. at 415. The trial court subsequently reduced the compensatory portion to $1 million
and the punitive remedy to $25 million, but the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the full $145
million award after applying the BMW factors. Id.
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award was justified because of State Farm's "massive wealth," and be-
cause of the fact that State Farm could conceal its conduct so that it
would be punished in only one out of every fifty thousand cases.87
The U.S. Supreme Court nevertheless struck down the punitive
award against State Farm, stating that it was "grossly excessive" under
the BMW guideposts and therefore served no legitimate state pur-
pose.88 Finding the case "neither close nor difficult," the Court clari-
fied that BMW factor number one-the defendant's degree of
reprehensibility-was the most important indicator of a punitive dam-
ages award's reasonableness. 89 In evaluating this factor, Justice Ken-
nedy stated that courts must consider whether:
(1) the harm was physical rather than economic;
(2) the tortious conduct demonstrated indifference to or
reckless disregard of others' health or safety;
(3) the conduct was a single occurrence or consisted of re-
peated actions; and
(4) the harm resulted from "intentional malice, trickery, or
deceit," versus "mere accident." 90
After laying out these principles and acknowledging that State
Farm's conduct was reprehensible, the Court nonetheless easily deter-
mined that the award was unjustified since it was based in large part
on State Farm's conduct nationwide.91 Justice Kennedy's focus was
primarily on the fact that each state had independent sovereignty to
evaluate and punish conduct occurring within its own borders and
could go no further than that without violating the strictures of due
process.92
In addition, the State Farm Court strongly reinforced the BMW
ratio analysis, holding notably that "few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.., will satisfy
due process. ' 93 Once again the Court stopped just short of establish-
ing an absolute bright-line rule, but reasoned that single-digit ratios
87 Id. at 415-16.
88 Id. at 417-18.
89 Id. at 418-19.
90 Id. at 419 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996)). The
Court opined that "[i]t should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole.., by compensatory
damages, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability ... is so
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deter-
rence." Id.
91 Id. at 420-23.
92 Id. at 422-23.
93 Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
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were more likely to survive due process analysis while still achieving a
state's legitimate goals of deterrence and retribution. 94
6. Philip Morris: Juries Cannot Consider Harm to Nonparties
In 2007, the Court again addressed the propriety of punitive dam-
ages in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,95 this time explicitly focusing
on the question of whether a jury could consider harm to nonparties
in assessing punitive awards.96 A jury granted the widow of a long-
time smoker $821,000 in compensatory damages stemming from the
tobacco company's wrongful behavior, and a whopping $79.5 million
in punitive damages. 97 Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer struck
down the punitive damages award as a violation of constitutional due
process,98 stating that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that a defendant be given "an opportunity to
present every available defense" before he may be punished. 99 The
majority reasoned that allowing awards based on harm to nonparties
would amount to a taking of a defendant's property because the de-
fendant would have "no opportunity to defend against the charge." 1°°
Additionally, awards based on harm to nonparties "would add a near
standardless dimension" to the calculation of punitive damages be-
cause factors such as the number of plaintiffs and the extent of harm
could not be established with any certainty.101
Perhaps realizing that its holding would not adequately deter
wrongdoers, 10 2 however, the Court stated that a jury could consider
94 Id.
95 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). The Court remanded the case to
the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration based on the federal high court's opinion. Id. at
357-58. The Oregon Supreme Court responded by once again upholding the punitive damages
award, this time on independent state grounds. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255,
1263-64 (Or. 2008). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to rehear the case, Philip Morris
USA, Inc. v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008) (order granting certiorari), but about nine months
later dismissed the writ as improperly granted, Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct.
1436 (2009) (order dismissing certiorari).
96 Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 349.
97 Id. at 349-50.
98 Id. at 349.
99 Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 354.
102 The Court's opinion does not explicitly discuss this potential problem. But see infra Part
III (discussing the law and economics notion that the deterrence goal of punitive damages de-
mands that society force defendants to pay for the times they escaped liability, including for
harms defendants caused to nonparties who decided it was not worth their time or money to sue,
or to nonparties who never even realized that they were harmed by defendants' actions).
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harm to nonparties when deciding the reprehensibility of a defen-
dant's conduct. 103 Justice Breyer made valiant efforts to explain this
confusing distinction:
[T]he Due Process Clause prohibits a State's inflicting pun-
ishment for harm caused to strangers to the litigation. At the
same time we recognize that conduct that risks harm to many
is likely more reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to
only a few. And a jury consequently may take this fact into
account in determining reprehensibility.104
Rather than solving the difficulty in applying such a double stan-
dard, the Court merely held that states may not use "procedures that
create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk" of juries punishing de-
fendants for harm to nonparties. 10 5
7. Exxon Valdez: Punitive Damages Jurisprudence Meets
Maritime Law
Coming to the case upon which this Article takes a special inter-
est, the Supreme Court most recently confronted its tortured punitive
damages jurisprudence in 2008 in the aftermath of the infamous Ex-
xon Valdez oil spill. 10 6 The tragedy spawned one of the most epic class
action lawsuits in history, spanning an unbelievable twenty years of
bitter litigation that involved tens of thousands of devastated plaintiffs
and almost incomprehensible environmental devastation.107 This
time, the Court faced the additional wrinkle of operating under mari-
time law as it wrestled with the proper scope of punitive damages
103 Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 357 (noting that the reprehensibility of conduct often
increases with the number of people harmed). Professor Chemerinsky pointed out the confusion
that would result from the Court's holding, stating that "[t]rial judges are likely to struggle for
years with formulating jury instructions that simultaneously tell the jury to consider and not
consider harm to people other than the plaintiffs." Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About
Punitive Damages, TRIAL, May 2007, at 72.
104 Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 357.
105 Id. The four dissenters were fairly baffled by the majority's attempted distinction. See
id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This nuance eludes me."); id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., joined by
Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
106 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). For an extensive discussion of
Exxon Valdez, see infra Part V (addressing the case's unique maritime context and the implica-
tions for the punitive damages award laid down in connection with it).
107 See Gabrielle Nomura, Exxon Valdez Ruling Sinks Fishermen's Hopes: Lawsuit Offers
Too Little, Too Late for Those Whose Dreams Floated on Tainted Waters, BELLINGHAM Bus. J.,
Aug. 2008, at 26, 26 (providing a brief history of the sad affair and chronicling the toll it has
taken on countless fishermen in Alaska); see also Felicity Barringer, $92 Million More Is Sought
for Exxon Valdez Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A14 (discussing some of the environ-
mental harm caused by the spill).
[Vol. 78:774
Penalizing Punitive Damages
awards.108 On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran
aground off the coast of Alaska, spilling eleven million gallons of oil
into Prince William Sound. 10 9 The ship's captain, Joseph Hazelwood,
was drunk at the time of the accident, and a jury determined that Ex-
xon recklessly failed to address Captain Hazelwood's history of alco-
holism.110 Exxon settled its claims with the United States and the
State of Alaska for spill cleanup, agreeing to pay substantial fines in
the several millions of dollars and far more than that to restore natu-
ral resources. 1 ' Plaintiffs in the remaining litigation were coastal
landowners, commercial fishermen, and Native Alaskans who sought
compensation for actual harm caused by the spill-price diminishment
in their fisheries, reduced value of their fishing vessels and permits,
harm to the general tourist trade, and debilitating emotional distress
and pain-and-suffering injuries. 112 The jury awarded $287 million in
compensatory damages, which after settlements and other payments
reached approximately $500 million,113 and a staggering $5 billion in
punitive damages against Exxon.114 During decades of subsequent
painful litigation challenging the constitutionality of the award, this $5
billion punitive remedy was reduced to $4 billion, raised to $4.5 bil-
lion, and then reduced again to $2.5 billion by 2006.115 Finally, in 2008,
the Supreme Court threw out the vast majority of the remaining puni-
tive damages judgment, reducing it to just $507.5 million, or one-tenth
of the original verdict.116
Significantly, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, relied prima-
rily on maritime law rather than on due process to reject the punitive
damages award,117 and generally ignored the fact that maritime law
barred compensation for many elements of actual harm.118 Like prior
108 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2611.
109 Id. at 2611, 2613.
110 Id. at 2613-14.
111 Id. at 2613 (outlining expenditures exceeding $1 billion).
112 See id.; Brief of Petitioners at 11, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219).
113 See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2614; In re Exxon Valdez (Valdez 1), 236 F. Supp.
2d 1043, 1058-60 (D. Alaska 2002), vacated and remanded, Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., Nos. 03-35166, 03-32519, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18219 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003).
114 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2614.
115 See In re Exxon Valdez (Valdez Circ I1), 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
116 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2633-34.
117 Id. at 2626.
118 See Brief Amici Curiae of Sociologists, Psychologists, & Law & Economics Scholars in
Support of Respondents at 3, Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2008 WL
275482, at *1-2 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economic Scholars]. As noted above,
see supra n.*, this Article's author was one of the contributors to and signatories of this amicus
brief, employing an economics-based argument in favor of punitive damages. Plaintiffs had al-
20~1
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, much of the majority opinion
focused on the problem of remedying unpredictability in imposing pu-
nitive damages in order to bring such awards in line with procedural
due process concerns against arbitrary judgments.119 Since punitive
damages express society's disapproval over the moral quality of a de-
fendant's conduct,1 20 Justice Souter was understandably worried about
determining a consistent measure of society's need for retribution.
Citing numerous quantitative studies, he determined that the median
ratio is generally less than 1:1 between compensatory and punitive
damages awards.121 Accordingly, the Court asserted that a ratio of 1:1
should "roughly express jurors' sense of reasonable penalties in [mari-
time] cases with no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within
the punishable spectrum. '122
leged that many economic harms, including lost value to fishing vessels and permits, as well as
emotional harms, had gone uncompensated under the idiosyncrasies of maritime law. Amici
Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra, at 3-18. Despite this argument, Justice Sou-
ter stated that the Court "take[s] for granted the District Court's calculation of the total relevant
compensatory damages at $507.5 million," without examining plaintiffs' claims that many ele-
ments of actual harm were precluded from this figure. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2634.
119 See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2629. Stanford law professor Jeffrey Fisher has
recently argued that, in light of the Exxon Valdez case, the Court's fears today are in fact largely
procedural, not substantive, in nature. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regu-
larizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5 (2009). Professor Fisher suggests that what the
Court is really attempting to accomplish is the regularization of punishment in order to avoid
wide disparities in sanctions for similarly harmful acts. Id. He concludes that the courts should,
therefore, defer to legislatures (and the standards they craft) in regulating the appropriate size of
punitive damages awards. Id. at 25.
120 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2621.
121 Id. at 2624-25 & n.14. Interestingly, despite Justice Souter's wide-ranging survey of
empirical statistical evidence, the authors of one of the studies he relied upon have written a
paper disputing his interpretation of their work. See Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise &
Martin T. Wells, Variability in Punitive Damages: An Empirical Assessment of the U.S. Supreme
Court's Decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 09-011, 2009). Professors Eisenberg, Heise, and Wells assert that
[t]he award reduction in Exxon Shipping may have promoted consistency with
other high compensatory award cases but the 1:1 principle [that the Supreme
Court] hints at is not statistically supportable across the broad range of compensa-
tory awards, and could contribute to an inability to tailor punitive awards to the
facts and circumstances of particular cases.
See id. at i. Economists Kip Viscusi and Joni Hersch support this assessment in their own work-
ing paper, arguing that "[t]he Court's conclusion that a 1:1 ratio establishes a fair upper bound
lacks a sound scientific basis." Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by Numbers:
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, at i (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law and Economics Working
Paper No. 09-04, 2009). This is an especially telling criticism of the majority in Exxon Shipping
Co. because it calls into serious question the Court's seemingly objective reliance on empirical
research to support its holding.
122 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2633.
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Despite this outcome, some legal scholars and academics had
hoped that the Court would use punitive damages as a means to ad-
dress the uncompensated harms resulting from unique limits under
maritime law.1 23 Specifically, maritime law did not allow the victims to
recover for consequential economic damages (such as price declines in
fishing vessels, permits, and tourist revenues), or for pain-and-suffer-
ing damages, leaving the plaintiffs in the case to bear much of the
harm themselves. 124 Justice Souter dismissed the attempt to use puni-
tive damages as extracompensatory, insisting that "punitives are
aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring
harmful conduct. '125 In doing so, the Court completely ignored the
reality that its holding could have exactly the opposite effect of that
which it intended. For if a defendant escapes liability for a portion of
the harm it causes (due to the quirks of maritime law, for example),
then it will necessarily have a diluted incentive to take proper care,
foiling society's deterrence objectives. 126
I. A Principled Economic Approach to Setting Punitive
Damages-or, Why the Supreme Court Needs a Lesson
in Law and Economics
Employing a law and economics perspective provides a signifi-
cantly different and far more principled approach to punitive damages
jurisprudence than that adopted by our own Supreme Court. Instead
of engendering debates in each case over irresolvable factors like rea-
sonableness and moral reprehensibility, an economic approach views
the assessment of punitive damages from a private and social deter-
rence perspective.12 7 Punishment for punishment's sake is not the
proper goal because inconsistency and unfairness are guaranteed by
pursuing such a course. Rather, legal rules (including punitive dam-
ages awards) should seek to appropriately deter socially undesirable
acts and maximize overall social welfare.
123 See Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 3-4; see also
Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2636-37 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Airport Depot Diner, Inc., 120 F.3d 166, 167 n.3 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting how the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims for damages based on "emotional
distress damages, price diminishment in fisheries that were not oiled, diminished value of limited
entry fishing permits or fishing vessels absent a sale of the permit or vessel ... [and] diminution
of market value owing to fear or stigma").
125 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2621.
126 See Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 19-26; see also
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 887-96.
127 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 870-76; see also Chapman & Trebilcock, supra
note 19, at 805-26; Cooter, supra note 19, at 1149-66.
2010]
The George Washington Law Review
A. The Dichotomy Between the Traditional Versus Economic
Approach to Law: A Simple Example
Let us take a simple example to highlight the dichotomy between
the traditional versus economic approach to the law. Imagine an au-
tomobile factory produces pollution that causes a harm of $1 million
to nearby residents. Let us further assume that the factory can install
a smoke arrestor at a cost of $2 million. Should the factory make the
purchase-i.e., is it socially optimal for our legal system to require it
to do so? Obviously not, since the cost of preventing the harm out-
weighs the resulting damage. However, if the factory faced a punitive
damages award of $5 million for intentionally or recklessly failing to
install the smoke arrestor, it may very well make the decision to
purchase one.128 Simply put, indiscriminate punitive damages awards
have the potential to create perverse second-order consequences, as
Justice O'Connor feared decades ago. 129 The company may choose to
go out of business, decrease production, or pass on the cost of the
punitive award in the form of higher prices to all customers.
As a second example, consider a company that ships oil. The
company can choose to single-hull, double-hull, or triple-hull its boats
in the interest of safety. In considering the appropriate level of care
to be taken, let us imagine that the direct cost of production of an oil-
based product is $20. Further, assume that the harm from an oil spill
accident would be $100, and that the probability of an accident (p)
128 This analysis assumes that the factory is unable to bargain with nearby residents to gain
the right to pollute. The seminal Coase theorem dictates that the parties will bargain around the
legal rule whenever a mutually beneficial agreement is possible, assuming no transaction costs
prevent the negotiation. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16
(1960). Thus, in a world without transaction costs, the factory would pay the neighbors $1 mil-
lion (or slightly more) to gain the right to pollute even if the governing law gives neighbors the
legal entitlement to clean air. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FoUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 83-84 (2004).
129 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42-44 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). Justice O'Connor opened her dissent boldly:
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they
have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately,
however, they have a devastating potential for harm. Regrettably, common-law
procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into the latter category. States rou-
tinely authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages without providing them any
meaningful instructions on how to do so. Rarely is a jury told anything more spe-
cific than "do what you think is best."
Id. at 42 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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varies with the level of care taken. Let us consider the optimal level
of care that the company should take in the table below. 130
Table 1. Total Social Costs by Level of Care
Probability Expected
Cost of of Accident Accident Total Social
Level of Care Care (p) Losses Costs ($)
None (single- 0 10% .10 x 100 = 10 10 + 20 = 30
hull) I
*Medium 4 3% .03 x 100 = 3 4 + 3 + 20=
(double-hull) *27
Very High 10 2% .02 x 100 = 2 10 + 2 + 20=
(triple-hull) 132
If it chooses to single-hull its boats, the company can lower prices,
but it will significantly increase the likelihood of catastrophic acci-
dents, so the total social costs are quite high ($30). If the company
chooses to triple-hull its boats, it reduces the likelihood of accidents,
but increases its costs of care dramatically, which leads to higher
prices and lower levels of activity. Because the double-hull tanker
balances both cost and safety, it might indeed prove to be the best
option from society's perspective-even if it presents slightly greater
risk of oil spills than a triple-hull tanker would-because total social
costs are lowest, at $27. Hence, lawmakers should adopt rules or reg-
ulations that incentivize taking this moderate level of care, not too
high and not too low.
If we assume, however, that the company might face punitive
damages of ten times the amount of harm (i.e., $1000) if it causes an
accident, let us reconsider the company's cost-benefit calculus.
Table 2. Total Company Costs by Level of Care
Probability Expected Total
Cost of of Accident Accident Company
Level of Care Care (p) Losses Costs ($)
None (single- 0 10% .10 x (100 + 0 + 20 + 110 =
hull) 1000) = 110 130
Medium 4 3% .03 x (100 + 4 + 20 + 33=
(double-hull) 1000) = 33 57
*Very High 10 2% .02 x (100 + 10 + 20 + 22 =
(triple-hull) 1000) = 22 *52
130 In this example, optimal care would be medium (i.e., double-hull tankers), and the re-
sulting full "price" of the product, incorporating care and expected accidents, would be $27.
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Thus, a company facing a potential $1000 punitive damages judg-
ment would rationally choose to take very high care, for that mini-
mizes the total costs the company expects to face. This outcome is
perverse from society's perspective, however, as it leads to dramati-
cally increased prices. The company would now have to charge $52 to
cover the expected punitive liability (even though the full social cost
when the company employs optimal medium care is just $27).131
Some traditional jurists might respond, "Well, what's the problem
with forcing the company to triple-hull its tankers in the interest of
safety and to raise the price to $52?" Unfortunately, there is a serious
problem with that logic. To see its flaws more clearly, let us now ex-
amine how unwarranted punitive damages liability impacts customer
welfare. Imagine a world of four potential customers whose utility
from using the oil-based product is as follows.
Table 3. Utility to the Customer
Utility from Oil
Customer Product
A $60 With punitive damages, only A can afford
$52 or more
B $50
C $40 But it is socially optimal for A, B, and C
to all buy the product because value >
total cost
D $25
Who purchases this oil-based product now? Only A does, be-
cause B and C cannot afford a price tag of $52. Nevertheless, it is
clear from this simple example that it is socially optimal for A, B, and
C all to buy the product in a perfect world, since they all value it at
greater than its full social cost of $27. Significantly, indiscriminate pu-
nitive damages awards have the potential to prevent people whose
utility from a product exceeds the product's full social cost from being
able to gain access to the product. This outcome is due to the unfortu-
nate fact that unnecessarily high punitive damages judgments incen-
131 See supra Table 1. Conversely, setting damages below actual harm caused lets the com-
pany off the hook for a portion of the injuries it creates, and it might therefore rationally choose
only to single-hull its tankers to avoid significant safety expenses. Clearly, then, if damages are
arbitrarily set too high or too low, we will witness a suboptimal result from an economic deter-
rence perspective.
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tivize companies to take excess care, leading to substantial price
increases and quantity decreases. 132
B. Impacts of the Ill-Considered Traditional Legal Approach
A few further considerations will show how the current approach
to punitive damages taken by the Supreme Court can have unin-
tended (and negative) economic and social consequences.
1. Philip Morris Hypothetical
To demonstrate a real-world application of the economic theory
laid out above, consider the Philip Morris case once again. Because
the Court refused to make Philip Morris pay for the harms it caused to
nonparties to the litigation,133 Philip Morris was (and still may be) par-
tially underdeterred from creating harm to consumers. Let's assume
that Philip Morris caused $10 worth of harm to ten different actors by
producing dangerous tobacco products, but only one party found it
worth the time and expense to actually sue for compensation. If that
was indeed the case, then Philip Morris caused total social harm of
$100, but was only held to pay for $10 of this harm because the Su-
preme Court explicitly prohibited any consideration of harm to non-
parties in assessing the punitive damages award.134 Philip Morris, or
any other similarly situated tortfeasor, would therefore rationally con-
tinue its behavior as long as it gained a benefit of more than $10,
rather than the socially optimal result of making Philip Morris con-
sider (and answer for) all of the social costs it was imposing on the
public.135
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court had upheld an enormous pu-
nitive damages award without employing this type of economic think-
ing (e.g., perhaps because the defendant had extraordinarily deep
pockets or was particularly reprehensible in its behavior), Philip Mor-
ris may have been overdeterred. Using the same oversimplified hypo-
thetical as above, if a jury assessed a punitive damages award of $1000
when actual total harm was only $100, then Philip Morris would likely
132 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 877-900.
133 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007) (holding that punitive damages
awards based "in part on [a jury's] desire to punish defendant for harming" nonparties
"amount[s] to a taking of 'property' from defendant without due process" of law (emphasis
omitted)).
134 Id. at 353.
135 See generally Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 887-96 (detailing companies' diluted
incentives to take precautions if they can escape liability for some portion of the time they create
harm).
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take extraordinary efforts to avoid paying these damages. If Philip
Morris (or consumers) gained $120 of value from its activity, then net
social welfare would increase by $20 by keeping the company in oper-
ation (i.e., $120 benefit minus $100 harm). If Philip Morris faced a
$1000 punitive damages award, however, it would no longer choose to
engage in this line of business at all and social welfare would corre-
spondingly decline. 136
2. Judgment-Proof Independent Contractors
A final problematic impact of ill-considered punitive damages
awards is that companies that potentially face such judgments will
have a perverse incentive to contract out their dangerous activities-
such as shipping oil in single-hull tankers-to judgment-proof inde-
pendent contractors who care not a whit about taking precautions be-
cause they lack the financial resources to pay any damages that they
might inflict. 137 In the event the independent contractor's low level of
care produces a catastrophic accident (and results in a punitive dam-
ages award), it can simply hand over its low level of cash on hand,
declare bankruptcy, and walk away from the financial impact of the
judgment.138
In fact, huge oil conglomerates now engage in this practice pre-
cisely because of the fear of the initial punitive damages award in Ex-
xon Shipping Co. For example, oil giant Shell was recently criticized
by Justice Ginsburg for attempting to avoid liability for cleanup costs
at a Superfund site near Bakersfield, California, by arguing that the
damage created by spilling its product was caused by an independent
third party.1 39 In addition, in 2002, one such independent contractor
136 See id. at 943-44. while it might be difficult for the reader to entertain this hypothetical
considering the devastating harm created by tobacco products, it must indeed be the case that
smokers gain some net utility from using a product that they know significantly decreases their
life expectancy by raising their cancer and heart disease risk.
137 See id. at 942-45. Companies facing potentially large punitive damages awards have an
incentive to use independent contractors because any resulting liability from accidents falls on
the contractor instead of the firm. If the contractor is "judgment proof," i.e., capitalized below
the level of the harm it might produce, it can take suboptimal care without the fear of facing
huge liability.
138 See id. at 943-44.
139 See Jesse Greenspan, High Court Mulls $42M Shell, Railroads Superfund Case, LAw360.
COM, Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.law360.comregistrations/create-login?articleid=88706&success
_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.law360.com%2Farticles%2F88706. In reviewing the statute
at issue, Justice Ginsburg conveyed her belief that "the one thing that was not intended was for
the parties to arrange themselves out of arranger liability by providing neatly that the moment
the product reaches a destination there's no continuing responsibility on the part of the seller."
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was sailing the oil tanker Prestige, which sank off the coast of Spain,
killing more than 250,000 seabirds, affecting 30,000 jobs, and costing
in excess of $2 billion to clean up. 14° The ship was owned by a Libe-
rian company, managed by a Greek company, carrying a Bahamian
flag, and chartered by a Russian oil-trading company.1 41 Not surpris-
ingly, the ship was an ancient single-hull tanker constructed in 1976142
that should never have been chartered in the first place. One can
clearly see that the traditional legal approach has so far produced un-
wanted and perverse consequences that must be fixed before greater
harm results.
C. Optimal Deterrence: When and How Should Punitive Damages
Be Awarded?
Thus, the sensible goal of an economic approach to punitive dam-
ages is to deter wrongdoers properly by setting damages equal to ac-
tual harm, assuming that defendants are always caught. 143 At the
same time, juries must also be vigilant to avoid indiscriminately hand-
ing out excessive punitive damages awards, not merely because of the
Supreme Court's due process concerns, but rather due to fear of po-
tentially creating devastating negative second-order effects: overdeter-
rence, decreased productivity, increased cost, decreased consumption,
and a decline in overall social welfare.
Does this mean that law and economics advocates are categori-
cally opposed to awarding punitive damages in all cases? Absolutely
not, but the justification for such awards has little to do with moral
reprehensibility and everything to do with creating optimal incentives
towards socially appropriate levels of care. 144 For example, if a defen-
dant escapes suit 50% of the time, then total damages in the case actu-
ally litigated should be set at twice actual harm to adequately deter
defendant's wrongful conduct. 145 If defendant escapes liability 99% of
the time it causes harm, then total damages should be set at 100 times
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, No. 07-1601,
2009 WL 453827 (Feb. 24, 2009).
140 Dale Fuchs, A Seeping Tanker Turns Spain's Beaches into an Oily Sandbox, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2003, at N8.
141 Emma Daly, Off Galicia, Spill Spreads Devastation and Doubt, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21,
2002, at A6.
142 Keith B. Richburg, Tanker Sinks Near Spain, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A18.
143 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 878-87 (discussing optimal level of damages
for a defendant whose liability can be definitely established).
144 Cf. id. at 870-76 (arguing that, although defendants should pay only for harm caused,
punitive damages serve to tax defendants for those instances when they escaped punishment).
145 See id. at 887-96.
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actual harm in order to incentivize the defendant to take care, and due
process is not at all violated by doing so!146
Thus, punitive damages should-nay, must-be imposed for de-
terrence purposes whenever a defendant has a chance to escape liabil-
ity, even in the absence of morally egregious behavior. 147 A principled
economic approach to punitive awards dictates that they should be
calculated by multiplying the actual harm in the instant case by the
inverse of the probability that the defendant escapes liability if he is
not caught when he ought to be. 148
D. Avoidance of Liability
But why do we assume that defendants are evading liability on
occasion? A defendant's avoidance of legal consequences might be
due to his intentional concealment of a wrongful act or even sheer
serendipity. Take, for example, an automobile company that inten-
tionally disguises the fact that it is repainting its cars to look like they
are new,1 49 or a company that conceals information about a product
defect from consumers. Less sinister, one might imagine a factory that
emits low-level pollution that is difficult for victims to detect. In ei-
ther case, the company is likely to avoid being sued in all of the cases
in which it creates harm because of the difficulty victims face in seeing
it. Punitive damages awards must step in to fill this void in compen-
sating victims when the defendant actually does indeed find itself
caught. If they do not, defendants will systematically face diluted in-
centives to take socially optimal levels of care.
Moreover, even in examples where victims know they have been
harmed, there are many situations in which the magnitude of the dam-
age is small enough that it is not worth the victim's time or expense to
litigate. For example, in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.,15°
the defendants were operators of a Motel 6 chain in Chicago, and
146 Due process is not violated because the modified punishment in my model accurately
reflects the severity of the crime that the defendant is well aware he has caused. The tortfeasor
previously escaped liability 99 times out of 100 and is now being justly held to pay for those
occasions he evaded the arm of the law. He cannot credibly claim that the punishment does not
fit his crime.
147 Id. at 887-91.
148 Id. at 889. Polinsky and Shavell offer an algebraic formula as well: "If H is the harm and
P is the probability of being found liable, then the injurer should pay H x 1/P-that is, HIP-
when he is found liable. Thus, the injurer's expected damages will be P x (HIP) = H." Id. at 889
n.48 (emphasis added).
149 Such was the practice of BMW. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563
(1996).
150 Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
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plaintiffs sued after suffering bedbug bites during a stay.15' The jury
awarded a mere $5000 in compensatory damages but also a substantial
$186,000 verdict in the form of punitive damages to each of the two
plaintiffs.152 Relying on the Supreme Court's misguided BMW and
State Farm reasoning, the defendants argued vigorously that punitive
damages could not exceed $20,000.153 Specifically, the defendants
pointed directly to language in State Farm that "'few awards [of puni-
tive damages] exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages .. .will satisfy due process,"' 154 and the fur-
ther arbitrary statement that "'four times the amount of compensa-
tory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety.' "155
Fortunately, Judge Posner rejected this bright-line argument, opt-
ing instead for a law and economics analysis of the punitive damages
award. 156 Posner opined persuasively that substantial punitive dam-
ages were in fact necessary to create adequate deterrence because
many individuals harmed by Motel 6's actions suffered such minor in-
juries that they would rationally choose not to sue and bear the costs
of litigation.157 The punitive damages award in Mathias therefore
serve[d] the additional purpose of limiting the defendant's
ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection and (pri-
vate) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is "caught" only half the
time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should be
punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times
he gets away.158
151 Id. at 673. Journalist Jan Greenberg described the facts more vividly:
A day after Burl and Desiree Mathias arrived in Chicago for a packaging trade
show, they found themselves itching to get away-at least from their downtown
hotel overrun with bedbugs.
After a night in the Motel 6 on East Ontario Street, the brother and sister
awoke to find itchy bumps all over their bodies, and the next evening they found
the culprit: legions of insects scurrying about in their beds.
Hotel management wasn't surprised by their horrified complaints, because it
had been renting out rooms infested with bedbugs for months to unsuspecting
customers.
Jan Crawford Greenburg, Big Award in Bug Case Stirs Debate, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 2003, at 1.
152 Mathias, 347 F.3d at 674.
153 Id. at 675-76.
154 Id. at 675 (alteration in original) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).
155 Id. at 676.
156 See id. at 677.
157 See id.
158 Id. (emphasis added).
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E. Punitive Damages as Quasi-Compensatory
Punitive damages can also serve the important purpose of operat-
ing as quasi-compensatory damages. In Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker,159 for example, the applicable maritime law limited damages to
those who were directly and physically harmed by the spill even
though others undoubtedly suffered substantial economic and emo-
tional harm.160 Punitive damages should serve to compensate those
individuals when redress is not otherwise available under governing
law. 161 Without the use of punitive damages to account for this short-
coming in maritime jurisprudence, much of the harm caused by Exxon
went uncompensated. Other potential tortfeasors would surely face
diluted incentives to take care if society failed to use punitive damages
in this quasi-compensatory manner.
F. Summary of the Economic Approach to Punitive Damages
Thus, law and economics scholars view punitive damages awards
as an opportunity to create optimal deterrence by making up for the
occasions where the defendant has (for whatever reason) previously
avoided liability and failed to compensate for the full harm caused..
Moreover, it should be emphasized here that no degree of morally
offensive behavior is required before a punitive award is justified in
the above scenarios. A morally innocent tortfeasor who unknowingly
allowed bedbugs to bite customers should still be asked to compensate
victims in all of the occasions in which it escaped liability, else it will
face diluted incentives to take adequate care in the future.
On the other hand, sound economic analysis dictates that impos-
ing punitive damages well beyond actual harm simply because a
tortfeasor's behavior was morally reprehensible can inadvertently lead
to overdeterrence, price inflation beyond optimum, quantity of goods
purchased below optimum, and a significant reduction in overall social
welfare. Consider once again the example of the oil-shipping com-
pany discussed above.162 If punitive damages are assessed far above
actual harm because of a drunken ship captain's morally reprehensible
behavior, then the company will do everything it can to avoid con-
fronting those damages in the future. The company may choose to
triple-hull its ships, which would dramatically increase oil prices, leav-
159 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
160 See generally Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118. As
noted earlier, in its disposition of the case, the Court did not really address these issues.
161 See id. at 23-26.
162 See supra Part H.A.
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ing consumers to bear the resulting costs. Alternatively, the deep-
pocket firm will hire judgment-proof independent contractors to en-
gage in work that runs the risk of punitive damages because under-
capitalized contractors need not worry about their level of care or
corresponding liability exposure. Clearly, the traditional legal ap-
proach to punitive damages awards can produce socially perverse con-
sequences that need to be fixed before even greater harm
materializes.
III. A Reexamination of the Supreme Court's Misguided
Approach to Punitive Damages
Given the principled economic analysis of punitive damages law
presented above, the flaws in the Supreme Court's approach quickly
become apparent. In its early punitive damages jurisprudence, the
Court shied away from drawing a hard line, choosing instead to focus
on procedures it hoped would avoid arbitrary results. In Haslip, the
Court held that a jury's discretion with respect to the amount of puni-
tive damages must be subject to "reasonable constraints.' 1 63 Because
the jury was given sufficiently focused instructions,'164 the Court up-
held the award. 65 In TXO, the Court added that punitive damages
may not be "grossly excessive,"'1 66 but upheld a large award because of
the potential loss to the plaintiff if TXO's wrongful acts had been suc-
cessful in creating greater harm.167
By the time of the BMW case, the Supreme Court decided it
needed to issue more specific guidelines to govern its due process
analysis. The Court famously laid out three "guideposts": (1) the de-
gree of defendant's reprehensibility, (2) the ratio between compensa-
tory and punitive damages, and (3) the comparison of the punitive
award to civil penalties in similar cases. 168 Justice Stevens pointed out
in his ratio analysis that, although there was no specific bright line,'169
punitive damages awards generally should not exceed ten times com-
163 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991).
164 Id. at 19-20.
165 Id. at 23. The Court also suggested that a ratio of four times compensatory damages
"may be close to the line" beyond which punitive damages could not go. Id.
166 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993).
167 Id. at 462.
168 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).
169 Id. at 582.
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pensatory damages.170 In doing so, the Court hoped that this would
lead to more predictable results and stem the tide of litigation.171
Unfortunately, BMW only opened the floodgates to debate and
controversy regarding its guideposts and limitations. In 2003, the
Court granted certiorari in the State Farm case in order to clarify that
the moral reprehensibility of the defendant was the most crucial of the
BMW guideposts. 172 The Court further explored the allowable ratio
of compensatory to punitive damages, reiterating that awards ten
times above actual harm would be considered constitutionally sus-
pect.173 Despite these refinements, the Court offered no principled
guidance to juries as to how to place a nonarbitrary monetary figure
on reprehensibility, or any sensible explanation for why an award nine
times beyond actual harm is presumptively sound whereas one that
was ten times larger is not. Ironically, the State Farm Court believed
that its ruling would lead to increased predictability because "'the
point of due process-[and] of the law in general-is to allow citizens
to order their behavior.' ,,174
Worse than that, the Supreme Court in State Farm and then in
Philip Morris also prohibited juries from taking into consideration any
of the harm to the myriad parties not present in the litigation.175 In so
doing, the Court effectively allowed each defendant to avoid paying
for the vast majority of the harm it had caused. 76 There is little doubt
that such myopic verdicts will inevitably dilute the deterrent impact
on other similarly situated tortfeasors. Why take socially optimal care
170 Id. at 581.
171 Id. at 574 ("[C]onstitutional jurisprudence dictate[s] that a person receive fair notice not
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty
that a State may impose.").
172 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419-24 (2003).
173 Id. at 425.
174 Id. at 417-18 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
175 See id. at 420-24; Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-58 (2007).
176 Of course, the Supreme Court's rationale in barring consideration of harm to nonparties
was that doing so would violate a defendant's due process rights to confront its accusers. Philip
Morris, 549 U.S. at 353 ("[A] defendant threatened with punishment for injuring a nonparty
victim has no opportunity to defend against the charge ...."); see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at
423 ("Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate
the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the repre-
hensibility analysis ...."). Although this makes sense, there was no balancing of this principle
against the competing principle that defendants should compensate all victims that they have
harmed. For, without this latter consideration, defendants will necessarily face diluted incentives
to avoid injuring others in the future.
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if you are only required to pay for a portion of the harm you actually
cause?
Finally, the recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. only served to
prove the point that the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurispru-
dence is a tortured mess. Hoping to once and forever put punitive
damages law to a well-settled rest, the Court limited punitive damages
in maritime cases to an amount equal to compensatory damages. 177
Ignoring the reality that Exxon was escaping a substantial portion of
liability for the harm it had caused to the Alaskan communities and
businesses that were not physically oiled by the spill, the Court instead
arbitrarily determined that the jury's outrage could adequately be ex-
pressed by punitive damages set exactly equal to compensatory dam-
ages. 178 Justice Souter declared: "In a well-functioning system, we
would expect that awards [of an approximately 1:1 ratio between com-
pensatory and punitive damages] would roughly express jurors' sense
of reasonable penalties in cases with no earmarks of exceptional
blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum .... "179
Despite these convoluted attempts at preserving constitutional
due process protections, if the Supreme Court truly wishes to elimi-
nate arbitrary and unpredictable punitive damages awards, the Jus-
tices must dramatically revise their approach to the entire issue.
There is no legally or economically principled justification for a jury to
award punitives based on gut reactions to how badly it feels a defen-
dant acted. Rather, principled jurists understand that punitive dam-
ages should be awarded only where tortfeasors have the potential to
escape liability for their actions. Thus, a defendant whose wrongful
behavior is detected only 1% of the time should face a punitive dam-
ages award (when it is indeed caught) that takes account of the 99%
of times it escaped liability, resulting in a total judgment of 1/.01 = 100
times harm in the instant case. Likewise, punitive damages should be
awarded in that case even if the defendant in no way meets the mod-
ern tort requirements of egregious behavior. Given this simple eco-
nomic analysis, the Supreme Court's arbitrary due process litmus test
of ten times actual damages as a constitutional ceiling on punitive
damages makes zero sense, and needs to be summarily abolished. It is
high time that punitive awards create proper incentives to take so-
177 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008).
178 Id.
179 Id. For the Ninth Circuit's subsequent actions in the case, see infra note 208 and accom-
panying text.
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cially optimal care rather than arbitrarily skew society's deterrence
and punishment goals.
IV. How to Deal Correctly with Special Cases Like Exxon Valdez
The Exxon Valdez case provides a unique example of where a law
and economics approach produces a far more predictable and princi-
pled result when dealing with punitive damages than traditional jurists
have been able to devise.
A. History of the Litigation
Let us revisit and explore the sad history of the case in some
depth. On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker crashed into
Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska.180 The spill devastated
the surrounding communities, destroying marine life, the fishing in-
dustry, tourism, and society in local towns. 181 In the wake of the spill,
investigators discovered that Captain Hazelwood was drunk at the
time of the accident, leaving his post right before the ship was to make
a critical turn. 182 Further investigation revealed that Hazelwood was
an alcoholic and that Exxon was aware of this fact. 183 In fact, Hazel-
wood had consumed at least five double-vodkas at waterfront bars on
the night of the spill, and was known to drink habitually "in bars,
parking lots, apartments, airports, airplanes, restaurants, hotels, at va-
rious ports, and aboard [other] Exxon tankers."'184
The spill resulted not just in massive environmental destruction
but also triggered an epic twenty-year litigation involving over 32,000
plaintiffs.185 Exxon settled with the United States for violations of nu-
merous federal statutes, ultimately paying approximately $125 million
180 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2611.
181 Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 4-18.
182 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2612. At the moment the tanker needed to move west
to avoid the underwater reef off Bligh Island, Hazelwood inexplicably left the bridge, later
claiming he needed to go down to his cabin in order to fill out paperwork. Id. Before doing so,
he made matters worse by "put[ting] the tanker on autopilot [and] speeding it up, [thereby]
making the turn trickier, and any mistake harder to correct." Id. He decided to put his third
mate, Joseph Cousins, in charge, despite Cousins's lack of training to navigate the dangerous
waters. Id.
183 In re Exxon Valdez (Valdez 11), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076-77 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated
and remanded, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006). Though Captain Hazelwood completed a near
month-long alcohol-treatment program as an employee of Exxon, he failed to continue with a
mandated follow-up program with Alcoholics Anonymous. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at
2612.
184 Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2612.
185 See id. at 2613.
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in fines and restitution.186 Exxon paid another $900 million in re-
sponse to a civil action by the United States and Alaska. 87 The com-
pany paid an additional $303 million in settlements with various
parties harmed by the spill, including property owners and
fishermen.188
Countless other civil suits remained after these settlements, and,
ultimately, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska certified a
mandatory class of those plaintiffs seeking punitive damages. 189 These
plaintiffs were landowners, commercial fishermen, and Native Alas-
kans.190 The court split the case into three phases: Phase I examined
whether Exxon and Captain Hazelwood had been reckless and could
therefore be subject to punitive damages; Phase II set the amount of
compensatory damages for Native Alaskans and commercial fisher-
men; and Phase III set the amount of punitive damages. 191 The jury
ultimately awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to com-
mercial fishermen, of which about $20 million was outstanding after
the trial court deducted settlements and other payments. 192 Native
Alaskans, in two settlements, agreed to $22.6 million.193 But the atten-
tion-grabber was the fact that the jury awarded a stunning $5 billion in
punitive damages against Exxon as well, a sum that was then-and
still is today-by far the single largest punitive damages verdict in
history.194
Traditional legal jurists justified the initial $5 billion punitive
damages award by pointing to Exxon's reprehensible behavior in al-
lowing a ship captain with a known drinking problem to pilot such a
dangerous vessel.195 The fact that Exxon knew about Captain Hazel-
wood's history of alcoholism but did little about it evidently did not sit
well with the jury, or with most Americans for that matter. 196 This
staggering punitive damages award triggered seemingly endless subse-
quent litigation. While Exxon admitted wrongdoing and was more
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 2614.
193 See id.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 2613-14.
196 See In re Exxon Valdez (Valdez I), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077 (D. Alaska 2004) (re-
counting Exxon's repeated failures to remove Hazelwood from command despite knowledge of
his drinking).
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than willing to pay the compensatory judgment, it vigorously chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the punitive damages portion of the
verdict.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit realized that the award might be
constitutionally suspect based on the decisions in BMW and
Leatherman and, therefore, remanded for reconsideration in light of
those cases. 197 The district court held firm, however, finding that the
award was justified under the three BMW guideposts. 198 It remitted
the punitive damages slightly from $5 billion to $4 billion based on
plaintiffs' willingness to accept such a judgment, which also brought
the total number in line with the single-digit-ratio analysis suggested
in BMW.199 Exxon appealed again, but before the parties submitted
any briefing, the Supreme Court decided State Farm, prompting the
Ninth Circuit to remand without opinion.200 On its third analysis of
the case, the district court added discussion of the State Farm holding,
once again determining that the original $5 billion was constitutionally
acceptable. 2°1 Because the case had been remanded specifically for
reduction of the punitive damages award, though, the district court
agreed to reduce the award to $4.5 billion, roughly nine times the
compensatory award. 202 On appeal, after considering yet another re-
mand to a defiant district court, the Ninth Circuit decided to remit the
award to $2.5 billion-a legal splitting of the baby, if you will.20 3 The
U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to end the legal
wrangling once and for all, and to address explicitly the issue of puni-
tive damages in the maritime context.204
Five of the nine Supreme Court Justices agreed with Exxon that
the jury had indeed chosen an excessive amount to award as punitive
damages, 205 and concluded that Exxon's conduct was morally repre-
hensible in a dollar amount set exactly equal to compensatory dam-
ages.20 6 This, Justice Souter opined without any sign of irony,
"roughly express[es] jurors' sense of reasonable penalties in cases with
197 In re Exxon Valdez (Valdez Circ 1), 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).
198 In re Exxon Valdez (Valdez 1), 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
199 Id. at 1068 & n.88.
200 See Valdez H, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
201 Id. at 1110.
202 Id.
203 In re Exxon Valdez (Valdez Circ HI), 490 F.3d 1066, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
204 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008).
205 See id. at 2633-34. Justice Alito did not vote in the case. Id. at 2634.
206 See id. at 2634. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the Court's opinion but expressed
their opinions that the caselaw compelling this resolution of the case was erroneous. See id.
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring).
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no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the punishable
spectrum ... .-"207 In the middle of 2009, the Ninth Circuit tacked on
5.9% interest from 1996 to the present date, amounting to $507.5 mil-
lion, to account for the fact that plaintiffs were due this money long
ago.20
8
B. Traditional Economic Analysis of the Exxon Valdez Case
One very interesting point worth exploring in the Exxon Valdez
case is that many notable law and economics scholars, including the
intellectual giants Mitch Polinsky and Steven Shavell, were employed
as consultants by the defendant oil company to argue that punitive
damages were altogether unnecessary. 209 Their argument was gener-
ally as follows: the chances of an oil conglomerate escaping litigation
after dumping millions of barrels of oil across the coast of Alaska are
essentially zero.210 Therefore, all the legal system need do to properly
incentivize Exxon to take due care is to impose damages in the
amount of actual harm.211 Anything larger than that would overdeter,
increase prices, and lead to negative second-order consequences. For
example, consumers might wind up paying $5 per gallon of gas, or
Exxon and other similarly situated oil conglomerates might begin to
hire judgment-proof (and careless) independent contractors to ship
their oil in order to avoid massive liability exposure.212
C. Maritime Law Changes the Equation: Three Categories of
Uncompensated Harm
Polinsky and Shavell's argument initially appealed to the author
of this Article, until he learned of the hugely consequential differences
between modern tort law and the well-established maritime law gov-
erning the Exxon Valdez disaster. Unfortunately, both traditional le-
gal jurists as well as traditional law and economists largely failed to
consider the harms precluded by maritime law for which Exxon effec-
tively escaped liability.213 The plaintiffs-commercial fishermen, Na-
207 Id. at 2633.
208 Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 568 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009).
209 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 870 n.*.
210 Id. at 904.
211 See id.
212 On the potential for indiscriminately large punitive damages awards to incentivize deep-
pocket firms to hire judgment-proof independent contractors to engage in the riskier lines of
their business, see supra Part II.B.2.
213 In fairness, Polinsky and Shavell consider the dilemma that there may be components of
actual harm that are not included in compensatory damages calculations. They reject using puni-
2010]
The George Washington Law Review
tive Alaskans, and landowners-sought compensation for a number of
injuries that would have been available under modern tort law but
that the idiosyncrasies of well-established maritime law prohibited.21 4
These uncompensated harms fell into three categories: (1) economic
harm from the spill that was precluded by the landmark 1927 maritime
case of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint;215 (2) economic harm
prohibited by maritime law because its extent at the time of the spill
was undetermined; and (3) noneconomic harm, such as emotional dis-
tress and pain and suffering, arising from the spill.21 6 As a result,
plaintiffs failed to recover for substantial price diminishment in fisher-
ies that were not oiled, diminished value of fishing permits and fishing
vessels, lost tax revenue, damage to area tourism, and the significant
pain and suffering caused by the disaster.2 17 Each of these categories
should be explored briefly to assess the magnitude of the uncompen-
sated harm, starting with the preclusive effect on damages from
courts' rulings under Robins Dry Dock.
1. Robins Dry Dock: Substantial Economic Damages to
Fishermen, Fishing Vessels, Permits, and Area Tourism
Were Largely Excluded
In Robins Dry Dock, charterers of a ship sued the operators of a
dry dock after the dock damaged the ship's propeller, delaying the
charterers' ability to use the ship. 218 The charterers did not own the
ship, and the dry dock was working under a contract with the ship's
owners.21 9 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, barred the plaintiffs
"from recovering against the dry dock because, as charterers and not
owners, they were not a party to the dry dock contract and were owed
no duty under it.220 In addition, the plaintiffs could not recover be-
tive damages to mitigate this problem, however, arguing that the best remedy would be a revi-
sion of the underlying rules used to calculate compensatory damages. See Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 19, at 939-41. I agree in principle with this position, but since it was impossible to
change the rules of maritime law in the middle of the Exxon Valdez case, the next-best solution
is to use punitive damages as a way to temporarily bandage its flaws. Ignoring the problem
results in grave injustice to the victims of Exxon's actions.
214 See generally Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 3-18.
215 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
216 See Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 3-4.
217 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Airport Depot Diner, Inc., 120 F.3d 166, 167 n.3 (9th Cir.
1997); Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 3.
218 Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 307.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 308-09.
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cause, while they suffered consequential damages due to delay, they
suffered no physical injury.221
The Robins Dry Dock ruling was generally an attempt to place a
policy limitation on the extent of maritime damages, in much the same
way as the requirement of proximate causation operates in land-based
torts.222 Land-based torts generally focus on whether harm is foresee-
able, or, as Professor Dan Dobbs has stated: "[tihe most general and
pervasive approach to proximate cause holds that a negligent defen-
dant is liable for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked
by his negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by
that conduct. '223 Anything beyond that is excluded from recovery. In
maritime-based torts, Robins Dry Dock analogously placed a further
restriction on foreseeability, requiring physical damage to a proprie-
tary interest as well.224 Thus, even though it was completely foresee-
able that Exxon's oil spill would damage the local fishing industry, if
those fishermen and vessels were not physically touched by the oil,
there was limited recovery available.
221 Id. at 308.
222 See generally THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 12-7 (4th
ed. 2004). Much of the controversy surrounding the Robins Dry Dock rule stems from the issue
of whether to apply a rule of negligent interference with contract or more traditional tort doc-
trines. See, e.g., Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1968)
("[Wie hesitate to accept the 'negligent interference with contract' doctrine .... [S]everal cases
often cited as illustrations of the application of the.., doctrine have been convincingly explained
in terms of other more common tort principles.").
223 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 444 (2000).
224 See Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 308; see also State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (refusing to permit recovery of economic
losses caused by shipping accident without physical damage to plaintiff's property, although in-
jury was perhaps foreseeable). Judge Wisdom vigorously disagreed with the M/V Testbank ma-
jority in his dissent, opting instead to apply the traditional tort principles of foreseeability and
proximate causation because he felt this would lead to fairer and more economically reasonable
results. See id. at 1035, 1046 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
Courts have carved out an extremely limited exception to the general maritime prohibition
created by Robins Dry Dock, allowing commercial fishermen to recover economic damages even
in the absence of physical harm. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 567-68 (9th
Cir. 1974). Yet courts have struggled to apply the general Robins Dry Dock rule, finding it
difficult to determine when a physical-damage component should apply and when liability
should simply be based on foreseeability and proximate causation. Compare Kinsman Transit
Co., 388 F.2d at 825 (denying recovery where neither plaintiff "suffered any direct or immediate
damage for which recovery [was] sought"), with Union Oil Co., 501 F.2d at 568 (permitting
recovery for commercial fishermen even in the absence of physical injury because the harm to
plaintiffs was foreseeable and imposition of liability would lower the likelihood of future harm).
When the Ninth Circuit in Union Oil Co. specifically refused to apply the Robins Dry Dock rule
to fishermen, the court stated that they enjoy a favored position in admiralty such that "their
economic interests [are] entitled to the fullest possible legal protection." Union Oil Co., 501
F.2d at 567 (citation omitted).
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Unfortunately for the plaintiffs in the Exxon Valdez case, the
ramifications of Robins Dry Dock were dramatic: substantial compo-
nents of measurable harm, likely totaling hundreds of millions of dol-
lars, were excluded from their compensatory damages judgment. 225
Among the items precluded were damages to commercial fishermen
in areas not oiled because of the stigma associated with fish from
Alaskan waters;226 loss of profits for residents of local towns reliant on
the fishing trade, including those who repaired boats, manufactured
fishing nets, and provided goods and services to commercial fisher-
men;227 and loss of profits in the tourism industry.2 8 Local govern-
ments also lost significant tax revenues because of fishery closures. 229
Worst of all, the oil spill caused the value of fishing permits to plum-
met, a devastating loss to Alaskan fishing communities. 230 Because of
the uncertainty caused by the oil spill as to the recovery of the fishing
grounds, individual permits lost $100,000 to $200,000 in value. 231 Fish-
ermen were left with useless equipment and permission to fish in an
ecosystem that had been ravaged and emptied; as one put it starkly,
"[t]hey've lost everything. ' '232
225 See Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 4-6.
226 See id. at 4.
227 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Airport Depot Diner, Inc., 120 F.3d 166, 168 n.3 (9th Cir.
1997).
228 See JOANNA ENDTER-WADA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SOCIAL INDICATORS
STUDY OF ALASKAN COASTAL VILLAGES: IV. POSTSPILL KEY INFORMANT SUMMARIES: SCHED-
ULE C COMMUNITIES 66-67 (1993), available at http://www.mms.gov/alaskalreports/1990rpts/92-
0052.pdf.
229 See Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 4-5.
230 See Charles Siebert, After the Spill, MEN'S JOURNAL, Apr. 1999, at 91, 94 (noting that
the price of fishing permits in Alaska is based entirely on demand, which fell precipitously in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill); see also Joel Connelly, Puget Sound at Risk of Oil Spill Too,
Alaskans Warn, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 3, 1999, at Al (reporting that fishing per-
mits lost ninety percent of their pre-spill value).
231 Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 5; see also J.
STEVEN PICOU & CECELIA G. MARTIN, LONG-TERM COMMUNITY IMPACTS OF THE EXXON
VALDEZ OIL SPILL: PATTERNS OF SOCIAL DISRUiION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS SEVEN-
TEEN YEARS AFTER THE DISASTER 14 (2007) (final report submitted to the National Science
Foundation).
232 See Nomura, supra note 107, at 26. One victim, David Mann, noted that at least sixty-
five percent of fishermen plying the waters before the spill are now gone: "'They've lost every-
thing. And to add insult to injury, after losing business, losing everything and waiting 20 years,
they find out it's worth [almost nothing]."' Id.
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2. Harm that Was Unknown at the Time of Trial Was
Not Recovered
Second, the Exxon Valdez oil spill caused additional uncompen-
sated harm in the form of economic damages, the extent of which was
unknown at the time of the 1994 trial.233 When the initial trial took
place, scientists dismissed links between the collapse of the Prince
William Sound herring fishery and the Exxon Valdez crash, but fur-
ther research suggested that the fishery collapse occurred immediately
after the spill. 234 As a result of this timing, plaintiffs were unable to
recover complete damages for harm to the fishery. Over the ensuing
two decades, some plaintiffs attempted to reopen consideration of the
damages that were unknown at the time of trial, but relatively little
has been successfully recovered to date.2 35
3. Sociological, Cultural, and Emotional Distress Damages Were
Barred
The third major category of uncompensated harm resulting from
the Exxon Valdez oil spill was the purely noneconomic injury-
namely the sociological, cultural, and emotional distress damages that
accompanied the disaster.236 Research in the wake of the Exxon
Valdez crash has revealed that the spill and its impact on the area's
natural resources devastated communities around Prince William
Sound.2 37 Sociologists have found that, in addition to the physical de-
struction, disasters can have "significant impacts on mental health
functioning 238 because of the disruption and stress they cause. 239
Prominent scholar Steven Picou's research has added that disasters
233 See Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 6.
234 See id. (citing Richard E. Thorne & Gary L. Thomas, Herring and the "Exxon Valdez"
Oil Spill. An Investigation into Historical Data Conflicts, 65 ICES J. MARINE ScI. 44, 44 (2007)).
235 See William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources Dam-
age Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 ALASKA L. REv. 135, 179-83 (2005). Professor Rod-
gers and his colleagues urged the U.S. Government and the State of Alaska to make their
"reopener claims" (for $92 million in additional compensation) under the terms of the 1992
settlement. Id. at 139. However, yet another lawsuit will be necessary to collect this money. See
Email from William H. Rodgers, Jr., Stimson Bullitt Professor of Envtl. Law, Univ. of Wash.
Sch. of Law, to author (July 14, 2009, 1:45 PM) (on file with author).
236 Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 7.
237 Id. at 7-8.
238 See Catalina M. Arata et al., Coping with Technological Disaster: An Application of the
Conservation of Resources Model to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 13 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 23, 23
(2000) (Finding that negative mental health effects often include depression, anxiety, post-trau-
matic stress disorder, and relationship troubles).
239 J. Steven Picou et al., Disruption and Stress in an Alaskan Fishing Community: Initial
and Continuing Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 6 INDUS. CRISIS Q. 235, 239 (1992).
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caused by human error, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, also tend to
have longer-lasting and more severe social, cultural, and psychological
effects than natural disasters.240 In communities based largely on the
economic existence of natural resources for harvest and use, this man-
made disaster created stress from economic uncertainty, from disrup-
tion of subsistence, and from damage to "a unique relationship to the
resources that have been contaminated. ' '241
Furthermore, the Exxon Valdez tragedy caused the deaths of
thousands of birds and marine animals,242 as well as drastic declines in
pink salmon and herring fisheries.243 The ecological effects of the spill
were in fact so severe that many still persist: the herring fishery was
closed eleven of the seventeen years after the spill and has still not
fully recovered. 244 Cleanup efforts strained local resources with the
influx of aid workers245 and created social conflicts between locals who
240 J. Steven Picou et al., Disaster, Litigation, and the Corrosive Community, 82 Soc.
FORCES 1493, 1495 (2004); Picou et al., supra note 239, at 239 (noting that those who live in close
proximity to the spill or who have unique relationships with the affected area may suffer ele-
vated stress); see also Arata et al., supra note 238, at 24; William R. Freudenburg & Timothy R.
Jones, Attitudes and Stress in the Presence of Technological Risk: A Test of the Supreme Court
Hypothesis, 69 Soc. FORCES 1143, 1154-59 (1991); Brent K. Marshall et al., Technological Disas-
ters, Litigation Stress, and the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 26 LAW &
POL'y 289, 291 (2004).
241 Picou et al., supra note 239, at 239. The communities surrounding Prince William Sound
derived much of their cultural, social, and economic identity from the available natural re-
sources, the destruction of which caused significant noneconomic harm. The community of Cor-
dova, for example, relied heavily on commercial fishing and subsistence harvesting. See Amici
Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 11 (citing Picou et al., supra note
239, at 241). Members of the community depend on the fisheries for jobs; they depend on natu-
ral resources activities as a means of maintaining social relationships, Picou et al., supra note 239,
at 241, as well as being "a part of how individuals define themselves and their quality of life,"
Arata, supra note 238, at 26.
242 See Picou et al., supra note 239, at 240-41 (summarizing environmental impacts recently
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska reporting that the spill killed
3500 to 5500 sea otters and 350,000 birds).
243 See Picou et al., supra note 240, at 1501 (identifying contamination of Prince William
Sound's spawning areas as a possible cause); see also Charles H. Peterson et al., Long-Term
Ecosystem Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 302 SCIENCE 2082, 2083 (2003).
244 See Status of Injured Resources & Services: Pacific Herring, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Trustee Council, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Recovery/status-herring.cfm (last visited Jan. 25,
2010) (listing the Pacific Herring as "Not Recovering" because it has shown "little or no clear
improvement since spill injuries occurred"); see also Bryan Walsh, Still Digging Up Exxon
Valdez Oil, 20 Years Later, TtME, June 4, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,19
02333,00.html.
245 See ENDTER-WADA ET AL., supra note 228, at 104-08, 144, 322-23; Mari Rodin et al.,
Community Impacts Resulting from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 6 INDUS. CRIsIS Q. 219, 223-26
(1992).
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participated in the cleanup and those who did not.246 Residents ex-
posed to the spill experienced high rates of anxiety, depression, and
even post-traumatic stress disorder.247 After all was said and done, the
almost incomprehensible cultural, social, and psychological damage
caused by the Exxon Valdez disaster was never close to adequately
addressed or repaired by the compensatory damages awarded in the
case.
D. Punitive Damages Should Take into Account Harm
to Nonparties
One of the major themes underlying this Article's analysis of the
Exxon Valdez case is the idea that nonparties who are impacted by a
tortfeasor's negligence must be compensated if that tortfeasor is to be
properly deterred. The reader will note that each of the harms de-
scribed above (which went uncompensated by the Exxon Valdez
Court) included some form of harm to a nonparty.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Philip Morris determined
that nonparty harms should not be included in a jury's punitive dam-
ages calculus because they are difficult to measure and would thus
"add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equa-
tion. ' 24 The Court also held that harms to nonparties should not be
included because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that a defendant have an opportunity to defend against
such a charge. 249 Thus, two significant problems arise: (1) how should
a court measure harm to nonparties without creating a "standardless
dimension"; and (2) how can harm to nonparties be considered with-
out violating due process?
In resolving the first issue, a court could simply measure the aver-
age amount of harm suffered by like individuals and then determine
how many people actually suffered this harm. Consider, for example,
harm to an individual living in a community on Prince William Sound.
He may have suffered financial or psychological harm because of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, but perhaps he could not join the litigation
because he did not suffer any direct injury. The harm to this person
detracts from overall social welfare, but because he is not a party to
the litigation, Exxon would escape liability under the Philip Morris
246 Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 14-15.
247 Id. at 15 (citing Lawrence A. Palinkas et al., Community Patterns of Psychiatric Disor-
ders After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1517, 1517-23 (1993)).
248 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007).
249 Id. at 353-54.
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approach and would not have to account for this harm in determining
its level of care.
To solve this problem, law and economics requires that a court
consider harm to this individual in calculating punitive damages. In
order to make such a calculation, the plaintiffs could present evidence
of the level of harm to each individual in these communities, consider-
ing quantitative factors such as loss in property value, lost wages, and
increases in medical expenses due to the psychological impact of the
spill. The court could then average the level of harm among members
of the community and multiply this average by the number of persons
in the community. For example, if individuals living on Prince William
Sound suffered an average harm of $10 and there are 1000 individuals
living in this area, then the court should properly assess damages of
$10 multiplied by 1000, or $10,000.
The main criticism of this novel approach is that it is very difficult
to determine the average level of harm as well as to ascertain which
individuals actually suffered such harm °50 Yet, courts are frequently
faced with difficult valuation issues; they choose to address them
rather than to ignore such problems because it is in society's best in-
terest to do so.251
Even if courts conquer the valuation question, that still leaves the
crucial second issue: the potential due process violation. As men-
tioned above, the Philip Morris Court held that factoring harm to
nonparties into punitive damages calculations would violate constitu-
tional due process because the defendant would not have the opportu-
nity to defend against such accusations.252 In these cases, however, the
issue of harm to nonparties does not arise with respect to liability, but
rather with respect to damages once liability has already been deter-
mined. The defendant has already had an opportunity to challenge
whether or not it is at fault, and the issue then becomes one of mea-
suring overall social harm rather than one of a defendant facing pun-
ishment without the chance to defend itself. For example, in Exxon
Shipping Co., the issue was not whether Exxon had caused the harm
resulting from the spill, but rather what was the appropriate magni-
tude of the award for the harm caused.253 The only real issue based on
250 Cf id. at 354 (questioning whether damages to third parties could be calculated when
the number, severity, and circumstances of such damages would be unknown at trial).
251 See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 474-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (dis-
cussing a challenge to the use of contingent valuation in the context of natural resources damage
and determining that such a valuation is not arbitrary and capricious).
252 Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353-54.
253 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613-14 (2008) (noting Exxon's stipu-
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harm to nonparties, therefore, was how much damage Exxon caused
to those individuals not parties to the litigation. Often in mass torts,
the level of harm is averaged, as courts do not assess the specific level
of harm to each individual plaintiff in large class action suits.254 Ad-
ding harm to nonparties as an element of punitive damages would
only require a court to determine how many individuals were actually
harmed in calculating damages. A defendant could certainly present
evidence that not all individuals were harmed, in which case the de-
fendant would have an opportunity to defend against such damages in
such a way that would satisfy any due process concerns.
E. Punitive Damages in Exxon Valdez Would Truly Play a Quasi-
Compensatory Role
Hence, although Exxon had little chance of escaping liability gen-
erally (it is, concededly, unlikely that such a massive oil spill would go
undetected and unlitigated),255 it ended up escaping liability for many
of the harms it caused due to the quirks of the governing maritime
law. In essence, Exxon was never forced to pay for the full damage it
imposed-never made to internalize all social harms it caused-and
thus still faces a diluted incentive to take due care.256
The law and economics approach seeks to correct this inadequacy
by using punitive damages as a kind of gap-filler to hold Exxon ac-
countable for all harms it caused. 257 In this sense, the punitive award
would really be quasi-compensatory, as opposed to true punishment
beyond actual harm caused.258 With this approach, the name "puni-
tive" is a misnomer, because the economic justification for punitive
awards is based on the principle of creating optimal deterrence, as
opposed to punishment per se. The punitive judgment would be
based not on punishing the immorality of Exxon's conduct, but in-
stead on the full social-cost impact of its actions. This approach would
eliminate arbitrary awards and lead to proper deterrence. Companies
lation to its negligence and liability for compensatory damages, but also its challenge of the
validity of punitive damages).
254 See generally 5 ALBA CoNrE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 17 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing methods by which courts manage mass torts).
255 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 904.
256 See Amici Curiae Brief of Law & Economics Scholars, supra note 118, at 20.
257 See id. at 22.
258 See id. at 18-23; see also Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 19, at 763-69 (discussing
punitive damages as a means of compensating for dignitary loss); Ellis, supra note 22, at 3, 10-12
(suggesting that compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses is a reason frequently
used by jurists for imposing punitive awards).
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such as Exxon would face a predictable economic calculus for deter-
mining how to model their behavior in the most effective fashion, in-
corporating all the benefits they create and all the costs they impose
on society.
Justice Souter explicitly rejected the quasi-compensatory ratio-
nale, however, stating that "this Court has long held that '[p]unitive
damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured
party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor ... and to deter him and
others from similar extreme conduct."' 259 Although that proposition
is undoubtedly true under various Court precedents, it ignores the fact
that the Court's holding accomplishes precisely the opposite of this
worthy goal: thousands of innocent plaintiffs never received full and
just compensation for their actual losses. Such an outcome inevitably
runs afoul of the deterrence and punishment goals that the Supreme
Court was supposedly furthering.2 60
Conclusion
Modern Supreme Court punitive damages jurisprudence has in-
creasingly focused on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, interpreting it as placing a constitutional limit on the
size of any punitive award.261 The Court has repeatedly stressed its
concerns with the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of such judg-
ments and therefore has set out a variety of tortured tests and arbi-
trary rules to help defendants avoid unnecessary or unfair exposure to
liability.262 The Court remains convinced that the defendant's degree
259 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 n.27 (2008) (alterations in original)
(quoting City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981)).
260 But cf Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 19, at 939-40 (arguing that, rather than using
punitive damages to serve this quasi-compensatory role, the remedies for missing components of
harm would be best pursued through revision of the rules used to calculate compensatory
damages).
261 See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (holding that the
"Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for
injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those ... who are, essentially, strangers to the litiga-
tion"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) ("The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments on a tortfeasor."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (finding
that due process requires "fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject [a person] to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose").
262 See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2633 (holding punitive damages in maritime cases
may not exceed compensatory damages); Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 353 (holding that puni-
tive damages cannot be applied to punish a defendant for injuries to nonparties); State Farm, 538
U.S. at 418 (finding punitive damages that do not fit within the BMW guideposts are grossly
excessive); BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 575, 580, 583 (requiring that punitive damages be
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of moral reprehensibility should be the most important factor in the
jury's calculus,263 and that the Constitution is inherently suspicious of
any punitive verdict that exceeds nine times actual damages.2 64 Any-
thing greater than that magic line would likely be considered grossly
excessive and run afoul of the due process maxim that the "punish-
ment should fit the crime. '265
Unfortunately, despite numerous attempts, our Supreme Court
still employs undefined, unprincipled, and largely subjective terms
that do little or nothing to correct the arbitrary nature of the punitive
damages awards that it seems to fear so greatly. It is far from clear
that standards such as "grossly excessive" have consistent meanings
across various juries and cases. While ever fearful of returning to a
Lochner-esque approach to substantive due process, 266 the Court
draws a bright-line rule that lacks reason-i.e., punitive damages can-
not exceed a single-digit multiple of the compensatory award-based
on an implicit sense of unfairness and lack of notice to wrongdoers.
Ironically, this approach fails to adequately address the Court's big-
gest concern: that punitive damages awards are arbitrary and illogical,
based not on the actual conduct of a defendant or society's need for
deterrence, but instead on a jury's emotional reaction toward this type
evaluated based on the defendant's degree of reprehensibility, the ratio between the actual or
potential harm and the punitive damages award, and the difference between the punitive award
and civil penalties imposed for comparable cases).
263 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 ("[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." (quoting
BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 575)).
264 Id. at 425 ("[Flew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensa-
tory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."); BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S.
at 581 (finding that prior caselaw suggested "that the relevant ratio was not more than 10 to 1").
265 See BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 575 n.24.
266 The Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is "one of
the most condemned cases in the United States history." BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIB-
ERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980). The Court in Lochner held that due process created a
substantive right to freedom of contract, even though no such right was explicitly stated in the
Constitution, and invalidated a New York statute protecting the health of bakery workers.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. Much later, Justice White expressed the Court's fears about creating
substantive rights when he stated:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore, great resistance to
expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments], particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
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of defendant, often a corporation with deep pockets and little sympa-
thetic appeal.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's misguided approach to punitive
damages law and to the issue of creating optimal deterrence dramati-
cally differs from that of sound law and economics principles. 267 The
Court seeks to deter undesirable behavior by examining a particular
defendant's relative wealth and how morally reprehensible its conduct
is in order to determine how great of a penalty is necessary to make
the defendant feel the consequences of its actions. Neither factor at-
tempts to address the root of the problem: what amount of damages is
necessary to incentivize injurers to take socially optimal care-not too
much, and not too little.
By contrast, a principled economic approach to punitive damages
jurisprudence would look far different. While current jurists and
scholars largely base their opinions on gut reactions that they have in
response to morally reprehensible behavior, legal legends like Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., have recognized that we need to separate emo-
tion from the law in order to create law that makes sense. 268 Legal
rules should be aimed at systematically creating appropriate levels of
deterrence in society, and that depends on the circumstances of each
case and whether a defendant had an opportunity to escape litigation
in previous cases.269 This realization means that the last thing we need
our Supreme Court to do is draw arbitrary lines in the sand to the
effect that ten times actual damages is too much.270 Conversely, it re-
quires careful thought about when punitive damages can compensate
for the chance that a defendant may have otherwise escaped liability
and, therefore, needs to have its sanction increased in order to create
optimal deterrence.
The law's ultimate goal in the punitive damages context should be
to formulate legal rules that maximize social welfare. This translates
into setting damages that are neither excessive nor insufficient, and
267 See supra Part III.
268 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458-69
(1897). Holmes made this observation in the context of contract law, noting that "[nlowhere is
the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of contract." Id. at
462. Holmes further expounded upon the "bad man" theory of the law, urging that if an ob-
server wants to learn "the law and nothing else," he "must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good
one, who finds his reason for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience." Id. at 459.
269 See supra Part III.
270 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); BMW of N.
Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 582.
[Vol. 78:774
Penalizing Punitive Damages
which are carefully calibrated to the circumstances of each case.
When a defendant can avoid liability-either due to intentional con-
cealment of wrongful facts or to innocent serendipity that plaintiffs do
not think it worth their while to sue-punitive damages are justified.
They should be set by multiplying the inverse of the probability of
detection by the amount of actual harm in the instant case, a figure
which could greatly exceed ten times actual damages without raising
any constitutional red flags. On the other hand, when a defendant
does not escape liability for harm it causes, punitive damages are com-
pletely unnecessary to deter and create only perverse second-order
consequences: increased price, decreased productivity, and reduced
social welfare. The time for the Supreme Court to understand this
problem and adopt the principled approach outlined herein is at least
two decades past due. Otherwise, further litigation is sure to con-
tinue, further unfairness is certain to result, and our Court and society
will both be the worse for it.
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